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UNDERMINING CHECKS AND BALANCES: THE
FALLOUT OF MAESTAS V. HALL
Levi A. Monagle*

“As long as redistricting is done by a legislature, it should not be
very difficult to prove that the likely political consequences of the
reapportionment were intended.” – Justice Byron White

I. INTRODUCTION
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* Class of 2014, University of New Mexico School of Law. My sincerest thanks
to Professor Michael Browde for providing me with a moment of clarity.
1. See infra Part V.A.
2. See infra Part V.B.
3. See infra note 103.
4. See infra Part V.C.
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Maestas v. Hall is a case about an unfortunate but uncontroversial
failure of a very political process: the devolution of legislative redistricting into partisan gerrymandering. More importantly, it is a case about a
judiciary struggling to find an apolitical solution to a political puzzle—
succeeding in some respects and failing in others. At its high points, the
opinion enshrines traditional redistricting principles alongside the equalpopulation principle and explicitly acknowledges the problems partisan
redistricting poses. At its low points, the opinion undermines the role of
the governor in the legislative process and gives undue deference to a
simple legislative majority which failed to construct a single partisan-neutral plan.
This note uses Maestas v. Hall and the litigation surrounding it as a
case study of the tendency of legislative redistricting to devolve into partisan gerrymandering.1 It criticizes the New Mexico Supreme Court for undermining a longstanding external check on legislative power by
minimizing the executive role in the redistricting process.2 At the same
time, it praises the court for reviving an internal check on legislative
power by requiring consideration of traditional redistricting principles in
future legislative redistricting.3 Ultimately, the note argues that legislatures are unfit to manage redistricting, and suggests that the courts should
involve themselves in the redistricting process whenever they have the
opportunity. It concludes by briefly discussing particular methods of combatting partisan gerrymandering in future redistricting controversies.4
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Legal Framework of Redistricting
In Reynolds v. Sims,5 the U.S. Supreme Court held that both houses
of state legislatures must be apportioned on the basis of population, and
that state legislative redistricting plans must construct districts “as nearly
of equal population as is practicable.”6 The purpose of this “equal-population principle” is to prevent vote dilution.7 The Supreme Court has held
that vote dilution violates the Equal Protection Clause.8
While adherence to the equal-population principle is the overriding
objective in congressional redistricting,9 state redistricting plans need only
meet the standard of substantial population equality.10 In either case,
“mathematical nicety is not a constitutional requisite.”11 A redistricting
analysis at the state level may lend greater weight to factors beyond the
equal-population principle than may a congressional redistricting analysis,12 so long as these factors further rational state policies13 and do not
violate the equal-population principle.14 A redistricting plan with population deviations over ten percent establishes a prima facie Equal Protection Clause violation.15 Court-drawn plans are held to stricter compliance
with the equal population principle than legislative plans,16 and deviations
from the equal population principle in court-drawn plans must be specifically justified under historically-significant state policies.17
In state redistricting cases, one factor that must be considered (in
addition to the equal-population principle) is adherence to the require-
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5. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
6. Id. at 577.
7. Id. The equal-population principle is also known as the “one person, one
vote” doctrine, see Maestas v. Hall, 2012-NMSC-006, ¶ 1, 274 P.3d 66, 70. See also id.
¶ 14 (vote dilution is accomplished “by means of state districting plans that allocate
legislative seats to districts of unequal populations, thereby diminishing the relative
voting strength of each voter in overpopulated districts”).
8. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 566.
9. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 732–33 (1983).
10. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 748 (1973).
11. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 569.
12. Id. at 578; see also Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 321 (1973) (citing Reynolds
in support of the position that state redistricting is more flexible than congressional
redistricting).
13. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 579.
14. Id. at 581.
15. See Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842–43 (1983).
16. See generally Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 26 (1975).
17. See Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 419–20 (1977).
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ments of the Voting Rights Act.18 The Voting Rights Act of 1965 prohibits
states from using any electoral practice that might deny or abridge voting
rights on a racial basis.19 A minority group challenging a redistricting
scheme under the Voting Rights Act must make three threshold showings: 1) that the group is sufficiently large and compact to form a majority
in a single-member district; 2) that the group is politically cohesive; and
3) that a white majority under the current districting scheme “votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.”20 Once these criteria are met, the key inquiry is whether the
minority group has “an equal opportunity to participate in the political
processes and to elect candidates of their choice.”21
B. The Legal Framework of Partisan Gerrymandering
Partisan gerrymandering is “the practice of dividing a geographical
area into electoral districts, often of highly irregular shape, to give one
political party an unfair advantage by diluting the opposition’s voting
strength.”22 It is a destructive practice, for “to the extent that a citizen’s
right to vote is debased, he is that much less a citizen.”23 Unfortunately,
such gerrymandering is “painfully ubiquitous.”24 It follows each decennial
census,25 as the majority party tries to strengthen its position in light of
(or in spite of) shifts in the partisan composition of the relevant electorate. Until 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court gave little attention to partisan
gerrymandering,26 focusing instead on racial gerrymandering.27 However,
in Davis v. Bandemer,28 the Court held that partisan gerrymandering
claims were subject to judicial consideration under the same logic as racial gerrymandering claims.29 The Court also held that partisan gerrymandering could violate the Equal Protection Clause if a plaintiff could
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18. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973bb-1.
20. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 50–51.
21. Id. at 44.
22. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 756 (9th ed. 2010).
23. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964).
24. Charles Backstrom, Samuel Krislov & Leonard Robins, Desperately Seeking
Standards: The Court’s Frustrating Attempts to Limit Political Gerrymandering, PS:
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND POLITICS, Vol. 39, No. 3 409, 409 (July 2006).
25. Heather Lamparter, An Overview of Partisan Gerrymandering Litigation in
the Last Twenty Years, 43 DUQ. L. REV. 455, 455 (2004–2005).
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
28. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
29. Id. at 125.
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30. Id. at 127.
31. Id. at 129.
32. Id. at 141.
33. Id. at 129–30.
34. Id. at 133.
35. Lamparter, supra note 25, at 457 (citing James A. Gardner, A Post-Vieth Strategy for Litigating Partisan Gerrymandering Claims, 3 ELEC. L. J. 643, 644 (Winter
2004)).
36. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
37. Id. at 281.
38. Id. at 282.
39. Id. at 283 (citing L. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13–9, p. 1083
(2d ed. 1988)).
40. Id. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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“prove both intentional discrimination against an identifiable political
group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group.”30
The Court noted in Bandemer that it should not be difficult to prove
intentional discrimination against an opposition party so long as the redistricting plan at issue had been legislatively drafted.31 The Court went
so far as to assume that the state legislature in Bandemer had acted with
discriminatory purpose (reinforcing the message that showing discriminatory purpose was an easy requirement to meet);32 however, the Court
overruled the district court’s holding that any adverse effect on a party’s
influence satisfied the second requirement of the Equal Protection analysis.33 Ultimately, the Court struggled to set out a clear standard for establishing discriminatory effect, stating broadly that discriminatory effect
“must be supported by evidence of continued frustration of the will of a
majority of voters or effective denial to a minority of voters of a fair
chance to influence the political process.”34
The Bandemer decision was not particularly useful to the lower
courts: between 1986 and 2004, not a single redistricting plan was struck
down as a partisan gerrymander under Bandemer.35 In 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court revisited the issue of partisan gerrymandering in Vieth v.
Jubelirer.36 A plurality of the Court (in an opinion authored by Justice
Scalia) argued that the history of irresolution surrounding partisan gerrymandering claims made it clear that there were in fact “no judicially discernible and manageable standards” for adjudicating such claims.37 Justice
Scalia characterized the history of the Bandemer test as “one long record
of puzzlement and consternation”38 and observed that “the test has been
criticized for its indeterminacy by a host of academic commentators.”39
Justice Kennedy, as a fifth vote concurring in the judgment, wrote separately that he was not willing to foreclose the possibility that some judicially workable standard might eventually be found.40 The status of
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partisan gerrymandering as a valid claim in federal court after Vieth is
tenuous at best.41
III. THE 2011 HOUSE REDISTRICTING BATTLE
Members of the New Mexico House of Representatives are elected
from seventy compact and contiguous single-member districts,42 and the
Legislature has the decennial responsibility to redraw district lines in
keeping with the federal census.43 However, when a legislature fails to
redraw district lines in compliance with Constitutional requirements, the
courts may assume the legislature’s redistricting responsibilities.44 The
most important of these requirements is that legislatures draw districts in
compliance with the “equal population principle.”45
Following the 2010 federal census, the majority-Democratic Legislature passed a redistricting bill—House Bill 39.46 The bill did not receive a
single Republican vote in its favor.47 It was vetoed by Republican Governor Susana Martinez, who claimed that the redistricting scheme violated
the equal-population principle and that it did so “for purely partisan
reasons.”48
Various groups challenged the constitutionality of the existing redistricting map.49 Rather than deal with each of these cases separately, the
supreme court consolidated all the pending redistricting cases under one
caption50 and tasked retired District Judge James Hall with creating a

02/06/2014 10:11:19
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41. The issue of a judicially manageable standard for political gerrymandering
claims was reexamined in League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S.
399 (2006), but the Supreme Court continued to rely on Vieth.
42. N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 3(C); N.M.S.A. 1978, § 2-7C-3 (1991).
43. N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 3(D).
44. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
45. See supra Part II.A.
46. Maestas, 2012-NMSC-006, ¶ 2. HB 39 will generally be referred to as “the
Legislative Plan,” as it is in parties’ briefs and in the statements of Judge Hall and the
New Mexico Supreme Court.
47. Maestas, 2012-NMSC-006, ¶ 8.
48. See House Executive Message No. 11 (Oct. 7, 2011) at 2, stating that “the only
way to avoid eliminating a district in the north central region and providing the appropriate additional new district on the Westside of Albuquerque was to grossly
overpopulate the Albuquerque districts, while simultaneously under-populating the
districts in north central New Mexico.”
49. Maestas, 2012-NMSC-006, ¶ 9.
50. The pending apportionment cases were consolidated under the caption of
Egolf v. Duran, No. D-101-CV-2011-02942 (N.M. D. Ct. January 3, 2011). Judge Hall’s
initial opinion in Egolf was divided into two sections (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) with numbered paragraphs. Judge Hall’s remand opinion in Egolf was
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House redistricting plan that passed constitutional muster.51 Six complete
redistricting plans were presented at the outset of the trial.52 Nine additional alternative plans were eventually produced.53 Representatives of
various Native American tribes also submitted a partial plan addressing
their concerns with the current redistricting scheme.54 This plan was referred to as the “Multi-Tribal/Navajo Nation Plan.”55
After eight days of testimony,56 Judge Hall adopted the Executive
Respondents’ Alternate Plan 3.57 In his opinion, Judge Hall held that
court-ordered redistricting required adherence to a de minimis population deviation standard58 (i.e., strict adherence to the equal-population
principle),59 and that in instances of court-ordered redistricting even minor deviations from ideal district population required careful
justification.60
Judge Hall proceeded to consider the claims of the Multi-Tribal/
Navajo Nation Petitioners. He found that the current redistricting scheme
violated the Voting Rights Act with regard to the state’s Native American
population,61 that the Multi-Tribal/Navajo Nation Plan effectively remedied the violations,62 and that the greater-than-de minimis population deviations under the Multi-Tribal/Navajo Nation Plan were justified by
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attached as an appendix to the New Mexico Supreme Court’s opinion in Maestas. For
the sake of clarity, citations to Judge Hall’s initial opinion in Egolf will differentiate
between the two sections of that opinion (e.g., “Egolf, No. D-101-CV-2011-02942,
Findings of Fact ¶ 8”); citations to Judge Hall’s remand decision will cite to the appropriate page of the Maestas appendix.
51. Maestas, 2012-NMSC-006, ¶ 9.
52. Id. ¶ 10. These were the plans originally presented: 1) the Legislative Plan
(HB 39); 2) the Executive Plan; 3) the James Plan; 4) the Sena Plan; 5) the Egolf Plan;
and 6) the Maestas Plan.
53. Egolf, No. D-101-CV-2011-02942, Findings of Fact ¶28.
54. Maestas, 2012-NMSC-006, ¶ 10.
55. Id.
56. Id. ¶ 3.
57. Id. ¶ 13.
58. Egolf, No. D-101-CV-2011-02942, Conclusions of Law ¶ 8.
59. Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975). “The population deviation of a district is the percentage by which a district’s population is above or below the ideal
population” under the equal-population principle. Maestas, 2012-NMSC-006, ¶ 23.
The ideal population is calculated by dividing a state’s total population by the number
of districts being drawn. Id. ¶ 5.
60. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 419–20 (1977).
61. Egolf, No. D-101-CV-2011-02942, Conclusions of Law ¶ 22.
62. Id. ¶ 23.

33996-nmx_44-1 Sheet No. 147 Side A

02/06/2014 10:11:19

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\44-1\NMX107.txt

Spring 2014]

unknown

Seq: 7

UNDERMINING CHECKS AND BALANCES

6-FEB-14

10:01

283

C M
Y K

Id. ¶ 24.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 29.
Id. ¶¶ 29–30.
Id. ¶ 27.
Id.
Id. ¶ 28.
Egolf, No. D-101-CV-2011-02942, Findings of Fact ¶¶ 32–41.
Id. ¶¶ 105, 111.
Egolf, No. D-101-CV-2011-02942, Conclusions of Law ¶ 32.
Id. ¶ 33.
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64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
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compliance with the Voting Rights Act63 and furtherance of other significant state policies.64
Judge Hall found that the Legislative Plan—the plan originally vetoed by Governor Martinez—contained population deviations that could
not be justified by “historically significant state policy or unique features,”65 and that the Egolf and Maestas Plans (which used the Legislative
Plan as a starting point)66 suffered from the same defects.67 Though each
of these plans remedied existing Voting Rights Act violations by incorporating the Multi-Tribal/Navajo Nation Plan,68 they all maintained population deviations in districts not affected by that plan (and unnecessary to
its furtherance) and were thus unsatisfactory to the court.69 However, incorporation of the Multi-Tribal/Navajo Nation Plan into the Legislative,
Egolf, and Maestas Plans did reassure Judge Hall that the State had a
significant interest in the protection of Native American voting rights and
that some population deviations were necessary to secure those rights.70
In his initial decision, Judge Hall noted that many of the unjustified
population deviations in the Legislative, Egolf, and Maestas Plans appeared rooted in partisan bias—in the desire of the Democratic majority
to preserve Democratic strongholds in the north-central part of the state
despite the fact that these districts were significantly underpopulated.71
Although the plans’ authors eventually attempted to remedy this partisan
underpopulation by consolidating a north-central district, Judge Hall
noted similar partisan bias in the revised plans’ proposed incumbent pairings72 and (finding similar bias similarly unacceptable) turned to the Executive’s proposed plans.
Judge Hall noted that while the original Executive Plan could not be
adopted for failure to remedy the violations of the Voting Rights Act
detailed in the Multi-Tribal/Navajo Nation Plan,73 it “recognize[d] the importance of low population deviations in court-ordered plans.”74 Judge
Hall mentioned no partisan concerns regarding the Executive Plan. Thus,
Judge Hall adopted Executive Alternate Plan 3, which incorporated the
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Multi-Tribal/Navajo Nation Plan into the original Executive Plan, reasoning that it “properly place[d] the highest priority on population equality
and compliance with the Voting Rights Act as required by law.”75
The Maestas and Egolf Petitioners petitioned for a writ of superintending control, requesting that the New Mexico Supreme Court assume
jurisdiction over the case and either remand it to Judge Hall with instructions regarding the proper legal standards for court-ordered redistricting
or reverse Judge Hall and adopt a different plan altogether.76 Concerned
that the dispute might delay House elections, the New Mexico Supreme
Court granted the petition and established an expedited briefing
schedule.77
IV. DECISION AND RATIONALE
A. Standard of Review: “Thoughtful Consideration”

C M
Y K

02/06/2014 10:11:19

75. Id. ¶¶ 33–34.
76. Maestas, 2012-NMSC-006, ¶ 3.
77. Id. ¶ 4.
78. Egolf, No. D-101-CV-2011-02942, Conclusions of Law, ¶ 11.
79. Petitioners’ Opening Brief at 33 (N.M. Sup. Ct. No. 33,387), 2012 WL
3236221, at *33 (citing Perry v. Perez, 132 S.Ct. 934, 941 (2012)).
80. Id. at 35, 2012 WL 3236221, at *35 (“The Legislature’s plan is entitled to
heightened consideration . . . because it is the only plan which is the product of the
open and transparent legislative process and the only plan which represents a balancing and reconciliation of competing interests undertaken by the people’s
representatives.”).

33996-nmx_44-1 Sheet No. 147 Side B

In his initial decision, Judge Hall held that the Legislative Plan was
not entitled to deference because it had not successfully navigated the
legislative process (i.e., been signed by the Governor) and become law.78
On appeal in Maestas, the Legislative Petitioners contested the holding,
arguing that “thoughtful consideration” should entail some degree of deference to the Legislative Plan. The Legislative Petitioners argued that redistricting, as a political task that requires the careful balancing of
competing interests, is within the Legislature’s purview regardless of the
Executive’s participation.79 The Legislative Petitioners focused on the importance of public deliberation, transparency of process, and opportunity
for public input, and argued that their plan was satisfactory on all three
counts.80 Finally, the Legislative Petitioners appealed to “the will of the
people” and argued that the “thoughtful consideration” standard “requires that a Legislative Plan be adopted by the Court if it is consistent
with the law, follows the last clear expressions of State Policy on redis-

33996-nmx_44-1 Sheet No. 148 Side A

02/06/2014 10:11:19

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\44-1\NMX107.txt

Spring 2014]

unknown

Seq: 9

UNDERMINING CHECKS AND BALANCES

6-FEB-14

10:01

285

tricting, avoids radical or partisan change, and respects other traditional
redistricting principles[.]”81
The Executive Respondents argued that Judge Hall’s understanding
of the “thoughtful consideration” standard should be upheld,82 and that to
hold otherwise (i.e., to equate “thoughtful consideration” with significant
deference) would allow partisan legislatures to engage in end-runs
around executive vetoes.83 Since governors as well as legislatures are “integral and indispensable parts of the legislative process,”84 the deferential
standard proposed by the Legislative Petitioners was premised on an inconsistency: claiming adherence to the legislative process as a justification
for ignoring an indispensable step in the legislative process. Finally, the
Executive Respondents argued that since “thoughtful consideration” was
not a deferential standard, it was proper of Judge Hall to disregard the
Legislative Plan due to its refusal to correct systematic under-population
of districts in the north-central part of the state.85
Maestas seemed to adopt the Legislative Petitioners’ interpretation
of “thoughtful consideration.” The court stated that “it would be unacceptable for courts to muzzle the voice of the people simply because the
Legislature was unable, for whatever reason, to have its redistricting plan
become law.”86 (Of course, the “reason” for the Legislature’s inability to
have its redistricting plan become law was perfectly clear—particularly to
the Republican legislators and citizens adversely affected by its partisanship). The court also drew directly from the Legislative Petitioners’ arguments regarding the importance of public comment, open deliberation,
and transparency, and reiterated the argument that legislatures rather
than courts were the proper balancers of competing political interests.87
The supreme court thus incorporated each of the Legislative Petitioners’

02/06/2014 10:11:19
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81. Id. at 31, 2012 WL 3236221, at *31 (emphasis added).
82. Respondents’ Opening Brief at 28 (N.M. Sup. Ct. No. 33,387), 2012 WL
3307078, at *28.
83. Id. at 31, 2012 WL 3307078, at *31 (arguing that if thoughtful consideration
were to be equated with deference, “a partisan legislature could simply pass any bill it
wanted, wait for a gubernatorial veto, file suit on the issue and have the court defer to
their proposal”).
84. Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 68, 79 (D. Colo. 1982); see also Sixty-Seventh
Minnesota State Senate v. Beens, 406 U.S. 187, 197 (1972) (indicating that neither the
preferred redistricting plan of a governor nor the preferred redistricting plan of a
state legislature were entitled to deference absent one plan’s successful navigation of
the full legislative process). Interestingly, the court in Beens indicated that a governor’s preferred redistricting plan could be entitled to the same “thoughtful consideration” as a legislature’s preferred redistricting plan.
85. Respondents’ Opening Brief at 32, 2012 WL 3307078, at *31.
86. Maestas, 2012-NMSC-006, ¶ 32 (emphasis added).
87. Id.
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three primary arguments for deference into the opinion (and failed to
take account of any of the Executive Respondents’ arguments to the contrary). The court then transitioned into a discussion of the state policies
which might properly justify deviations from the “one man, one vote”
principle.88
B. Substantive Issues: De minimis Variation, Redistricting Objectives,
and Partisan Bias
Beginning with Judge Hall’s initial decision,89 extending to the supreme court’s review of that decision in Maestas v. Hall, and concluding
with Judge Hall’s decision on remand, each court faced three basic questions. First, what is the scope and substance of the de minimis variation
standard?90 Second, what weight is to be given to “traditional redistricting
principles” versus the “one man, one vote” principle? Finally, what constitutes “partisan bias” or a “partisan plan?”
Because Judge Hall’s findings of fact regarding the Voting Rights
Act violations alleged by the Multi-Tribal/Navajo Nation Plan were not
challenged on appeal, the court adopted the Multi-Tribal/Navajo Nation
Plan and said that any redistricting scheme eventually adopted would
have to accommodate that plan.91 The question then turned to the relative
importance of the equal-population principle vis a vis “legitimate and rational state policies” which might result in increased population
deviations.92

R

02/06/2014 10:11:19
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88. It is unclear whether the supreme court meant for the direct transition to a
discussion of possible reasons for deviation to suggest a limiting principle regarding
the scope of deference under “thoughtful consideration,” or whether the supreme
court saw a discussion of “the will of the people” (in the context of legislative deference) as a good mood-setting introduction to a discussion of delineated policies for
deviation and inadvertently instituted a policy of deference without a limiting
principle.
89. Egolf v. Duran, No. D-101-CV-2011-02942 (N.M. D. Ct. January 3, 2011).
90. Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975).
91. Maestas, 2012-NMSC-006, ¶ 18; on appeal, the Egolf Petitioners questioned
whether, based on his findings of fact, Judge Hall had adequately accounted for the
Hispanic community of Clovis in his Voting Rights Act analysis. Citing the decision of
a federal three-judge panel in Sanchez v. King, No. 82-0067-M (D.N.M. 1984) (finding
that Clovis’ Hispanic population had suffered an array of racial and ethnic discrimination), the court held that Judge Hall should provide on remand for “an effective majority-minority district in and around the Clovis area unless specific findings are made
. . . that Section 2 Voting Rights Act considerations are no longer warranted.” Maestas, 2012-NMSC-006, ¶ 20. For Judge Hall’s response, see text accompanying supra
notes 80–86.
92. Maestas, 2012-NMSC-006, ¶ 21.
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The Legislative Petitioners argued that Judge Hall had erred in applying a de minimis population deviation standard,93 that that standard
only applied to redistricting by federal courts,94 and that the de minimis
standard should not be applied by a court when doing so would override
legitimate and rational state policies not in conflict with the Constitution
or the Voting Rights Act.95 For their part, the Executive Respondents argued that the de minimis standard applied to all courts engaged in redistricting96 because more stringent standards were necessary when the
judiciary became embroiled in the quintessentially legislative function of
political interest-balancing.97
The New Mexico Supreme Court adopted the Legislative Petitioners’ position and overruled Judge Hall. It held that under U.S. Supreme
Court precedent, courts engaged in redistricting are required to consider
legitimate and rational state policies “whenever adherence to state policy
does not detract from the requirements of the Federal Constitution.”98
The court affirmed Judge Hall in acknowledging the de minimis population deviation standard for all court-ordered redistricting.99 However, the
court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court had not given clear definition to
that standard100 and that other court-approved plans generally contained
population deviations between five and ten percent.101
The court then turned to the question of whether “legitimate and
rational state policies” could justify greater-than-de minimis population
deviations in court-ordered redistricting schemes in New Mexico. It recognized the legitimacy and rationality of a number of state policies contained in the bipartisan New Mexico Legislative Council redistricting
guidelines,102 including the non-division of precincts, preservation of recognized communities of interest, and the consideration of geographic
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93. Petitioners’ Opening Brief at 9, 2012 WL 3236221, at *9.
94. Id. at 15, 2012 WL 3236221, at *15.
95. Id. at 19, 2012 WL 3236221, at *19.
96. Respondents’ Opening Brief at 23, 2012 WL 3307078 at *23. The Executive
Respondents cited to two New Hampshire redistricting cases in support of this argument: Below v. Gardner, 963 A.2d 785, 791 (N.H. 2002), and Burling v. Chandler, 804
A.2d 471, 478 (N.H. 2002).
97. Respondents’ Opening Brief at 22, 2012 WL 3307078 at *22.
98. Maestas, 2012-NMSC-006, ¶ 21 (citing White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 795
(1973)).
99. Id. ¶ 25.
100. Id. ¶ 26.
101. Id. ¶ 26, n.2 (citing cases).
102. New Mexico Legislative Council, Guidelines for the Development of State and
Congressional Redistricting Plans, (January 17, 2011), available at http://www.nmlegis.
gov/lcs/redcensus/docs/Approved%20Redistricting%20Guidelines.pdf.
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boundaries.103 After discussing the particular application of some of the
terms contained in those guidelines,104 the court held that courts engaged
in redistricting could and should105 deviate from the equal-population
principle in furtherance of rational legislative policies, provided that
those policies did not conflict with the constitution or the Voting Rights
Act.106
Noting the importance of apparent and actual neutrality107 in the politically charged endeavor of redistricting, the court was quick to note
that partisan plans should not be adopted, and that “a court’s adoption of
a plan that represents one political party’s idea of how district boundaries
should be drawn does not conform to the principle of judicial independence and neutrality.”108 While the court recognized that Judge Hall had
scrutinized many of the proffered plans for such partisan bias,109 it observed that he had lent insufficient attention to partisan bias in Executive
Alternate Plan 3 (due in part to the fact that it had been introduced into
evidence at the eleventh hour, “after the political science experts who
had scrutinized the [other] plans . . . were no longer available to testify).110
The court then proceeded to detail a number of partisan problems with
Executive Alternate Plan 3.111
Because the court ultimately concluded that Judge Hall thought
himself too closely bound by the equal-population principle112 the case
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103. Id. The guidelines indicate that plans must provide districts of substantially
equal population, that plans shall not split precincts, that plans must be in compliance
with the Voting Rights Act, that plans shall only use single-member districts, and that
plans shall draw districts “consistent with traditional districting principles” (including
making efforts to preserve communities of interest, considering political and geographic boundaries, preserving existing districts where possible, and considering the
residency of incumbents).
104. Maestas, 2012-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 35–38.
105. Id. ¶ 39 (“By only deviating [from the equal-population principle] for enunciated state policy reasons, the court complies with the constitution and furthers the
state’s interests”).
106. Id.
107. Id. ¶ 31.
108. Id. ¶ 29.
109. Id. ¶ 4.
110. Id. ¶ 40.
111. Id. ¶¶ 40–42.
112. Id. ¶ 39. In the remand decision, Judge Hall observed that his findings and
conclusions in the initial decision did not support this assertion of the court that he
found himself “bound to a plus-or-minus one-percent population deviation with the
sole exception of addressing the requirements of the Voting Rights Act.” Judge Hall
further observed that the standard adopted by the court was the same standard that
he had used in his initial decision, and that the deviation range of 6.68% in the initial
plan was actually greater than the deviation ranges in two of the cases cited by the
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was remanded to Judge Hall with specific instructions to “draw a partisan-neutral map that complies with [the equal-population principle], the
requirements of the Voting Rights Act, and considers other historical and
legitimate state redistricting principles.”113 The court also instructed Judge
Hall to incorporate the Multi-Tribal/Navajo Nation Plan into any redistricting map that he drew.114
In a terse remand decision, Judge Hall collapsed the supreme court’s
discussion of deference to the Legislature into an observation that the
supreme court (while adopting the language of the Legislative Petitioners’ arguments for deference) had not specifically required that deference
and thus “agreed” that he “was not required to adopt the Legislative Plan
as long as [he] gave that plan thoughtful consideration.”115 Since Judge
Hall found that he had given “thoughtful consideration” to the Legislative Plan in his first analysis, he did not reconsider it.116 Judge Hall then
proceeded to a second analysis with Executive Alternate Plan 3 (rather
than the Legislative Plan) as his starting point.117
Judge Hall balked at the notion that he had concluded that he was
“bound to a plus-or-minus-one-percent population deviation,”118 noting
that “the legal standard on population equality that was adopted and applied by this Court matches the supreme court’s recitation of the applicable law almost word-for-word.”119 Nonetheless, in keeping with specific
supreme court instructions120 and armed with the added flexibility that the
“new” population deviation standard afforded him, Judge Hall proceeded
to reexamine the possibility of reunifying a number of recognized communities of interest that had been split under Executive Alternate Plan 3.
Judge Hall ultimately made only minor changes to that plan.121
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court in arguing against the applicability of a ±1% standard. Maestas, 2012-NMSC-006
app. at 32–45, 274 P.3d at 91.
113. Maestas, 2012-NMSC-006, ¶ 43(emphasis added).
114. Id.
115. Maestas, 2012-NMSC-006 app. at 32–45, 274 P.3d at 90.
116. See id. at 90 n.3. Judge Hall also observed that “the starting point for the
creation of a final plan was left to [his] discretion” by the supreme court. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 91 n.6.
119. Id.
120. Maestas, 2012-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 43–45.
121. Maestas, 2012-NMSC-006 app. at 32–45, 274 P.3d at 92–97.
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V. ANALYSIS & IMPLICATIONS
A. The Tendency of Redistricting to Devolve into Partisan
Gerrymandering
Redistricting is an inherently political process.122 Every line drawn
on a map of partisan voters has partisan effects.123 It is not a question of
intent: however lines are drawn, with or without partisan intent, they
have partisan impact. In the words of Robert G. Dixon, Jr. (characterized
by the Bandemer court as “one of the foremost scholars of reapportionment”124), “the key concept to grasp is that there are no neutral lines for
legislative districts.”125
Redistricting has traditionally been viewed as a proper function of
the legislature because of its inherently political nature.126 However, the
longstanding use of redistricting to disenfranchise black voters has led to
increased judicial scrutiny of redistricting.127 The avidly partisan redistricting efforts of the political branches have come under increased scrutiny
since the 1960s.128 With the formulation of workable standards for the
examination of proposed plans, the judiciary has incrementally assumed a
more active role in the redistricting process.129
After Vieth, the future of partisan gerrymandering as a distinct claim
is far from certain. Those interested in preventing partisan gerrymandering would be well advised to look to methods beyond private litigation to
further their objectives. Maestas points to one such method: impeding
partisan gerrymanders with an executive veto. The purpose of this note,
then, is threefold: first, to emphasize the relative unfitness of legislatures
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122. In Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 554 (1946), Justice Felix Frankfurter observed that “[t]he one stark fact that emerges from a study of the history of [legislative] apportionment is its embroilment in politics, in the sense of party contests and
party interests.”
123. See Leon Weaver, Semi-Proportional and Proportional Representation Systems
in the United States, in CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES 191, 193 (Arend Lijphart & Bernard Grofman eds., 1984) (“The necessity of
drawing district lines present [sic] well-nigh intractable problems . . . no matter how
they are drawn, some groups are advantaged and others are disadvantaged. Gerrymandering exacerbates, but does not create, this problem”).
124. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 129 n.10 (1986).
125. Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Fair Criteria and Procedures for Establishing Legislative
Districts, in REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRICTING ISSUES 7 (B. Grofman, A.
Lijphart, R. McKay & H. Scarrow eds., 1982).
126. See, e.g., White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 795 (1973).
127. See supra note 27.
128. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
129. See Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983); Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407
(1977); Chapman v. Mier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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130. Maestas, 2012-NMSC-006, ¶ 27.
131. See infra notes 134–53 and accompanying text.
132. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 133 (1986).
133. The court states in Maestas that “the courts should not select a plan that seeks
partisan advantage.” 2012-NMSC-006, ¶ 31.
134. Robert G. Dixon, Jr. & Gordon W. Hatheway, Jr., The Seminal Issue in State
Constitutional Revision: Reapportionment Method and Standards, 10 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 888, 905 (1968–69).
135. Gordon E. Baker, Whatever Happened to the Reapportionment Revolution in
the United States?, in ELECTORAL LAWS AND THEIR POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 257,
274 (Bernard Grofman & Arend Lijphart eds., 1986).
136. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
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to manage redistricting in a fair manner; second, to stress the importance
of checks on legislative partisanship; and third, to urge state courts to
embrace a more aggressive role in the redistricting process whenever the
legislature and executive come to impasse.
The judiciary should not abdicate its responsibility for effectuating
fairness and the appearance of fairness130 to a branch of government more
concerned with partisan advantage.131 The Court in Bandemer stated that
redistricting is “a task that should not be monitored too closely unless the
express or tacit goal is to effect its removal from legislative halls.”132 Effective removal of redistricting from legislative halls should in fact be the
tacit goal whenever possible. While the New Mexico Supreme Court declined to take this step in Maestas, it is a step that the New Mexico courts
should take to an increasing degree moving forward—in recognition of
the reality that redistricting is a task well-suited to the judiciary and illsuited to the legislature.
The alternative is for the judiciary to continue to promulgate the
fiction that partisan legislatures can realistically be expected to produce
redistricting plans that do not seek partisan advantage.133 Common sense
and available evidence do not support this premise: legal scholars and
political scientists deride it; case-by-case evidence (including the evidence
available from Maestas) undermines it; and the courts themselves evade it
or question it outright.
At the academic level, the idea that partisan legislatures might produce non-partisan redistricting plans is viewed with great skepticism. Legal scholars have stated that “legislative dominance of the [redistricting]
function is too often tantamount to a defendant’s self-determination of
his guilt or innocence,” adding that “it is unrealistic to expect a body to
legislate against its own interests.”134 This view is shared by political scientists, who characterize legislative redistricting as “an obvious conflict of
interest”135—an observation rooted in James Madison’s aphorism that no
man should be a judge in his own case.136 Other political scientists recog-
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nize that one of the traditional impediments to partisan gerrymandering—the complexity and difficulty of the task—has been largely
eliminated by the invention of powerful redistricting software.137 There is
consensus among many experts that the task of redistricting should be
transferred out of legislative hands—either to designated bipartisan committees138 or to other bodies which do not have a vested interest in the
outcome of redistricting.139
Case-by-case evidence of legislative redistricting drives the academic point home.140 The litigation around Maestas v. Hall is replete with
evidence of naked partisanship: Ben Lujan, the Democratic Speaker of
the House of Representatives, specifically instructed his mapmaking consultant to develop a plan that “avoided eliminating a district in the [Democratic] north-central region of the state,”141 even though the districts in
the north-central region of the state were under-populated.142 An expert
witness testified that when the Executive Respondents were instructed by
the court to incorporate the Multi-Tribal/Navajo Nation Plan into their
existing plan, they “systematically increased Republican performance in
several districts” in a manner “not made necessary by accommodating the
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137. See Backstrom, Krislov & Robins, supra note 24, at 411 (“Complexity has
historically been the real deterrent [to partisan gerrymandering]. But today’s computers effortlessly run through hundreds of alternative plans which would have required tedious human manipulation by expensive experts. The census and other data
are usually obtainable by a few clicks of the mouse. Ingenious programs can match
past voting patterns to current residential locations.”).
138. Dixon & Hatheway, supra note 134 (“The choice of bipartisan commissions
has substantial justification, given the inherent deficiencies of legislative and gubernatorial dominance and the virtual nonexistence of the animal called the
‘nonpartisan.’ ”).
139. Baker, supra note 135 (“[T]ransferring the function of redrawing constituencies to noninvolved parties is a move considered basic by many . . . a key consideration should be a decisive role for nonlegislators.”).
140. See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 113–18 (1986). The Bandemer
court recounted how the Speaker of the House of Representatives of Indiana said
that the driving motivation behind the majority’s redistricting map was “to save as
many incumbent Republicans as possible. Id. at 117 n.5; see also Backstrom, Krislov
& Robins, supra note 24, at 411–12 (discussing the severe partisan gerrymandering
contested in League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006));
Noah Litton, The Road to Better Redistricting: Empirical Analysis and State-Based
Reforms to Counter Partisan Gerrymandering, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 839, 849 (2012) (“In
Illinois, private memorandums between the Democratic Congressional Campaign
Committee and state legislative leadership offices instructed that a ‘critical part of the
remapping process is altering the districts of incumbent Republicans to complicate
their paths back to Washington.’ ” (citation omitted)).
141. Egolf, No. D-101-CV-2011-02942, Findings of Fact ¶ 32.
142. Id. ¶ 34.
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tribal concerns.”143 Ultimately, HB 39 passed through the House without
a single Republican vote144—making it a per se partisan plan. Judge Hall
found fatal partisan bias in the Legislative Plan,145 the Egolf plans,146 and
the Maestas plans.147 The court in Maestas found fatal partisan bias in
Executive Alternate Plan 3,148 criticizing improper incumbent pairings
and a consolidation which created a “strongly partisan district.”149
In light of the case-by-case evidence of the tendency of redistricting
to devolve into partisan gerrymandering, courts faced with the task of
redistricting find themselves in the awkward position of paying lip service
to legislative primacy while constantly striking down legislative plans for
partisan bias. The court in Maestas wrote that while it was “the Legislature’s constitutional responsibility” to manage the redistricting project,150
it was “because of the inability of our sister branches of government to
find a way to work together” that “the judiciary in New Mexico finds
itself embroiled in this political thicket.”151 While arguing that partisanneutral maps could in fact be crafted,152 the court nonetheless required
Judge Hall to “reject all of the previously submitted plans because of the
political advantage sought by the parties”153—a clear admission that the
political process had failed to produce a single partisan-neutral plan.
B. Misguided Deference
Substantial evidence indicates that partisan legislatures will produce
redistricting plans that seek partisan advantage.154 At the same time, the
New Mexico Supreme Court has stated in Maestas that redistricting plans
that seek partisan advantage are unacceptable in the eyes of the state
judiciary.155 The nature of the impasse suggests its own solution—trans-
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143. Petitioners’ Opening Brief at 25, 2012 WL 3236221, at *25.
144. Maestas, 2012-NMSC-006, ¶ 8. See also Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 115 n.2 (noting
that the redistricting plan in that case passed the Indiana legislature along party lines).
145. Egolf, No. D-101-CV-2011-02942, Findings of Fact ¶ 41.
146. Id. ¶ 105.
147. Id. ¶¶ 110–11. The fatal partisan bias in both plans came in the form of unfair
incumbent pairings. For instance, one of the Maestas plans grouped three Republican
incumbents into the same Roswell district. Id.
148. Maestas, 2012-NMSC-006, ¶ 40 (“[B]ecause of its own recognition that the
plan contained significant partisan performance changes, the district court should
have rejected Executive Alternate Plan 3 . . . ”).
149. Id. ¶ 41.
150. Id. ¶ 6.
151. Id. ¶ 27.
152. Id. ¶ 43.
153. Id. ¶ 43 (emphasis added).
154. See supra Part IV.A.
155. Maestas, 2012-NMSC-006, ¶ 31.
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ferring the redistricting task from the legislature to some more suitable
body,156 in keeping with the recommendations of legal scholars and political scientists alike.157 Given its deep-seated concern for neutrality and
fairness, the judiciary is an obvious candidate for future management of
redistricting. However, under federal Supreme Court precedent, state
legislatures have primary jurisdiction over state legislative redistricting,
and state courts may not “pre-empt the legislative task.”158 The question,
then, is not whether courts can ignore the redistricting plans of the legislature altogether and simply craft their own—they cannot—but how
much deference (if any) they should adopt in reviewing legislative redistricting plans crafted with partisan intent.
In Maestas, the “thoughtful consideration” standard became a proxy
for the debate over how much judicial deference should be given to legislative redistricting plans.159 The meaning of “thoughtful consideration”
was strongly contested at the trial level.160 A key point of contention was
whether or not legislative plans had to be signed by the Governor and
adopted into law in order to merit the deference that the Legislative Petitioners claimed was their due.161 The Executive Respondents argued that
the Governor was “integral and indispensable” to the legislative process,162 and that the Legislative Plan was not entitled to deference because
it had been vetoed by the Governor and never became law.163 The Legislative Petitioners downplayed the significance of the Governor’s veto,164
focusing instead on 1) the ability of the Legislature to balance competing
political interests, 2) the Legislature as the vessel for “the will of the people,” and 3) the transparency of the Legislature’s process in inviting input
for the Legislative Plan.165
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156. See supra text accompanying notes 138–139.
157. See supra notes 134–139 and accompanying text.
158. See White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 795 (1973); Sixty-seventh Minnesota State
Senate v. Beens, 406 U.S. 187, 195–201 (1972); Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108, 114 (1971);
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 160–61 (1971).
159. See Maestas, 2012-NMSC-006, ¶ 32.
160. See supra Part III.A; the standard is also referred to in the parties’ briefs as
“special consideration” or “heightened consideration.”
161. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
162. Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 68, 79 (D. Colo. 1982); see also Beens, 406
U.S. at 197 (indicating that neither the preferred redistricting plan of a governor nor
the preferred redistricting plan of a state legislature were entitled to deference absent
one plan’s successful navigation of the full legislative process).
163. Respondents’ Opening Brief at 30–31, 2012 WL 3307078, at *30–31.
164. The issue of the gubernatorial veto was briefly addressed in Petitioners’ Opening Brief at 25–27, 2012 WL 3236221, at *25–27.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 79–81.
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The New Mexico Supreme Court made two mistakes when it
adopted the Legislative Petitioners’ deferential conception of “thoughtful
consideration:”166 first, it undermined an existing check on legislative
power by effectively writing the executive branch out of the redistricting
process; second, it missed an opportunity to place an additional check on
legislative power by failing to assert an aggressive judicial role in the redistricting process. As a result, the power to redistrict lies almost entirely
(and certainly more than “primarily”) in the hands of a legislature that is
institutionally prone to abusing it.167
The court’s first mistake is disturbing. In justifying its adoption of a
deferential conception of “thoughtful consideration,” the court stated
that “the Legislature is the voice of the people, and it would be unacceptable for courts to muzzle the voice of the people simply because the Legislature was unable, for whatever reason, to have its redistricting plan
become law.”168 This was a critical omission: the reason that the Legislature was “unable . . . to have its redistricting plan become law” was that
the Governor vetoed it.169 It was not as though the Legislature left its redistricting plan in its other pants when it went to obtain a gubernatorial
signature, or as though the Legislature’s dog ate the plan that the Governor intended to sign (if only anyone could remember what it said). An
executive veto is a common, foreseeable, and constitutionally-enshrined170
reason for the non-implementation of any piece of legislation, popular or
not—and so designed as a key step in a system of checks and balances.171
By downplaying the practical significance of a gubernatorial veto,
the court has undermined the well-established executive role in New
Mexico’s legislative process172—at least with regard to redistricting.173
Moreover, it has done so on the basis of a highly questionable but
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166. See supra text accompanying notes 86–88.
167. See supra notes 134–153 and accompanying text.
168. Maestas, 2012-NMSC-006, ¶ 32 (emphasis added).
169. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
170. N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 22; U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
171. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (“[T]he great security against a
gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving
to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.”).
172. The court’s minimization of this most basic executive role is especially puzzling in light of its introductory acknowledgment that “there is no more important
task for the Legislature and the Governor to perform than the decennial reapportionment of districts for state and national elective offices.” Maestas, 2012-NMSC-006, ¶ 1
(emphasis added).
173. It remains an open question whether the same logic that supported a circumvention of the Executive role in the legislative process in the context of redistricting
might be applied in other contexts.
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broadly arguable premise—that the will of a simple majority of the Legislature, standing alone in the face of substantial internal opposition and an
executive veto, nonetheless represents the “voice of the people” to a degree that merits judicial deference.174 One of the most important purposes
of the judiciary is to resist legislative wrongdoing175—to deter wrongdoing,
rather than defer to it.176 However, if a governor’s veto of a legislative
redistricting plan is to be ignored by the courts, “a partisan state legislature could simply pass any [plan] it wanted, wait for a gubernatorial veto,
file suit on the issue and have the court defer to their proposal.”177 Downplaying the significance of an executive veto undermines the executive
role in the legislative process, and may result in significant damage to
New Mexico’s system of checks and balances.178
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174. This premise was criticized by Judge Sutin, writing in lone dissent: “I think the
Majority is mistaken in thinking that the ‘public will’ is measured solely or even primarily from an un-enacted legislative plan. . . . The legislative plan passed with all
Republicans and some Democrats voting against passage. The Governor, elected by the
will of the majority of voters, vetoed [it].” Maestas, 2012-NMSC-006, ¶ 57 (Sutin, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
175. See Honorable Gerald E. Rosen & Kyle W. Harding, Reflections Upon Judicial Independence As We Approach the Bicentennial of Marbury v. Madison: Safeguarding the Constitution’s “Crown Jewel”, 29 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL 791,
798 (2001) (“The role of the judiciary is to protect against majority excess when that
excess violates fundamental liberties. A judge need not give credence to a legal argument simply because it is supported by public opinion.”).
176. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[T]he firmness of the
judicial magistracy . . . not only serves to moderate the immediate mischiefs of those
which may have been passed, but it operates as a check upon the legislative body in
passing them; who, perceiving that obstacles to the success of iniquitous intention are
to be expected from the scruples of the courts, are in a manner compelled, by the very
motives of the injustice they meditate, to qualify their attempts.”).
177. Respondents’ Opening Brief at 31, 2012 WL 3307078, at *31 (quoting Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 68, 79 (D. Colo. 1982)). It should be noted that this direct
circumvention did not ultimately come to pass in Maestas: while the court indicated
that legislative plans should generally be granted deference so as to avoid the “muzzling” of “the voice of the people,” it did not order Judge Hall to grant such deference
to the Legislative Plan that he had discounted in his initial decision. Some may take
comfort from this result. Others may remain anxious over the seeming institution of a
policy of judicial deference to simple legislative majorities—however subtly that policy is stated.
178. Ironically, it was the Legislative Petitioners that attempted a “checks and balances” argument in Maestas—but their argument appeared to contradict itself. On the
one hand, the Legislative Plaintiffs claimed that “the Governor’s role with respect to
passed legislation was limited to approving or vetoing the legislation,” Petitioners’
Opening Brief at 26, 2012 WL 3236221, at *26 (citing State ex rel. Clark v. Johnson,
120 N.M. 562, 575 (1995)); on the other hand, they claimed that allowing a governor
to “stand aside from the political process” and “veto whatever is passed by the legisla-
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If the court’s first mistake is disturbing, the court’s second mistake is
merely unfortunate. Dedicated as it was to the task of “articulating the
legal principles that should govern redistricting litigation in New Mexico,”179 the court in Maestas missed a golden opportunity to establish a
more substantial judicial role in the redistricting process. This is unfortunate because redistricting is a task far better suited to the judiciary than
to the legislative or executive branches.
The ultimate goal of redistricting is fairness,180 and the foremost goal
of the judiciary is fairness.181 In contrast, the foremost goal of the Legislature is partisan advantage.182 This arrangement—where a branch concerned with partisan advantage handles a task demanding fairness while a
branch almost solely concerned with fairness watches from the sidelines—is absurd. Other justifications for the arrangement—efficiency,
legislative expertise, public input, and the like—are increasingly under-
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ture”—in keeping with the gubernatorial role they just suggested—“undermined the
entire political process of redistricting that is mandated by our constitution and laws.”
Id. at 27, 2012 WL 3236221, at *26. If it was the contention of the Legislative Petitioners that the propriety of executive involvement in the redistricting process hinged
solely on “use [of] resulting litigation to finally dictate his or her vision of the ideal
political landscape,” id., it should be noted A) that the “resulting litigation” in Maestas originated with the Legislature, which did not see fit to attempt a veto override,
and B) that upon turning the matter over to the courts, the executive branch was no
longer in a position to “dictate” anything to anyone.
179. Maestas, 2012-NMSC-006, ¶ 4.
180. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565–66 (1964) (“the achieving of fair and
effective representation for all citizens is concededly the basic aim of legislative apportionment”); see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 269 (2005); Davis v.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 162 (1986); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 766 (1983).
181. See New Mexico Rules Annotated Rule 21-100 (“A judge shall uphold and
promote the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary and shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.” (emphasis added)); In re Vincent,
2007-NMSC-056, 143 N.M. 56 (characterizing the impartiality and the appearance of
impartiality of the judiciary as a compelling government interest); In re Schwartz,
2011-NMSC-019, 149 N.M. 721 (emphasizing that judges must be aware of their duty
of impartiality at all times); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (“Considerate men . . . ought to prize whatever will tend to beget or fortify that [virtuous
and disinterested] temper in the courts: as no man can be sure that he may not be tomorrow the victim of a spirit of injustice, by which he may be a gainer to-day.”); see
also Chief Justice Ruth McGregor, Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson & Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, A Conversation About Judicial Independence and Impartiality, 89
JUDICATURE 339, 339 (2006) (“The truth is that we would like an umpire who favors
us. But since you can’t be assured of a favorable umpire on your side, and you don’t
want an umpire who favors the other side, you take . . . the second best thing, which is
a neutral umpire. That’s what you must want if you believe in our democratic system
and you believe in the rule of law.”).
182. See supra notes 134–53 and accompanying text.
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mined by technological advances which allow for the generation of hundreds of plans by a few quick parameter inputs,183 and totally undermined
by the fact that courts have access to the same non-partisan redistricting
consultants that currently work hand-in-hand with legislative redistricting
committees.184
The judiciary surely recognizes this absurdity. At the same time, the
courts understand that the first attempt at redistricting belongs to the legislative branch.185 What becomes important, then, is a shift in judicial selfconception—a recognition that while redistricting belongs to the Legislature on paper, it belongs to the judiciary in spirit.
Particularly because it had set itself to the task of articulating core
redistricting criteria, the Maestas court missed the opportunity to make
an aggressive statement to this effect—to put the Legislature on notice as
to a heightened state of judicial vigilance regarding partisan redistricting
efforts in New Mexico. If redistricting “should not be monitored too
closely unless the express or tacit goal is to effect its removal from legislative halls,”186 the New Mexico Supreme Court should have vowed to monitor redistricting closely, and let observers draw what conclusions they
may. Such a statement would have signaled an end to judicial passivity in
the face of an absurd delegation of authority, while simultaneously avoiding (on paper) “[preemption of] the legislative task.”187
Although the New Mexico Supreme Court’s decision in Maestas v.
Hall undermined the gubernatorial veto and failed to embrace enhanced
judicial oversight of the legislature, it implemented an important check
on legislative gerrymandering when it enshrined traditional redistricting
principles alongside the equal-population principle.188 As the arguments
in Judge Hall’s court made clear, the proper relation of these traditional
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183. See supra note 137.
184. For instance, demographer Brian Sanderoff of Research & Polling, Inc.
worked hand-in-hand with legislators of both parties in the early stages of the redistricting process, crafting plans to their particular specifications. Maestas, 2012-NMSC006, ¶ 7. Unfortunately, this meant that much of Mr. Sanderoff’s time was spent crafting blatantly partisan plans, like the plan requested by Speaker Lujan. See supra notes
144–49 and accompanying text. When it issued its remand order, the New Mexico
Supreme Court ordered Judge Hall to draw a new plan in independent consultation
with a redistricting expert, mentioning Mr. Sanderoff as such an expert under New
Mexico Rules Annotated Rule 11-706. Maestas, 2012-NMSC-006, ¶ 45. Judge Hall
worked directly with Mr. Sanderoff in crafting his final plan. Maestas, 2012-NMSC006 app. at 32–45, 274 P.3d at 89.
185. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
186. See supra text accompanying note 132.
187. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
188. Maestas, 2012-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 34–39.
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redistricting principles to the equal-population principle was unclear
prior to the opinion in Maestas.189 While no exact balancing formula was
detailed in the opinion, it did at least clarify that traditional redistricting
principles were as important as (if not more important than) the equalpopulation principle for the purposes of any New Mexico court’s analysis.
This clarification should have beneficial effects on future redistricting. Unilateral judicial focus on equal-population districts at the expense
of traditional redistricting principles has the effect of encouraging (or at
least facilitating) gerrymandering.190 Where the importance of traditional
factors like district compactness is downgraded, “[n]o legislature should
find it difficult to satisfy a standard of nearly exact equality, disregarding
local subdivision lines . . . to achieve new levels of sophistication in partisan gerrymandering.”191 Thus, in reintroducing traditional principles to
the redistricting equation, the court has complicated the task of gerrymandering for the future Legislatures that will likely attempt it. In the
absence of the external checks on gerrymandering discussed above,192 this
internal check on gerrymandering could prove to be an important one.
C. Alternative Responses to the Problem of Partisan Gerrymandering
Basic checks and balances and the use of traditional redistricting
principles are both important tools in the fight against partisan gerrymandering, but there are other tools available as well. Many states have created non-partisan redistricting commissions designed to side-step the
conflict of interest inherent to pure legislative redistricting.193 These com-
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189. See supra Part III.B.
190. Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Computers and Redistricting: A Plea For Realism, 2
RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS & L. 15, 16 (1971–72) (“[P]ushing deviations to miniscule
levels does have the negative result of encouraging gerrymandering (or at least making it easier) by requiring abandonment of traditional restraints such as preserving
local communities and following local political subdivision lines. The issue now
overtly becomes political party advantage.”).
191. Robert G. Dixon, Jr. & Robert B. McKay, Election Districts: Substantial Population Equality, and Exceeded Expectations, 1 HUM. RTS. 74, 80 (1970–71); see also
Baker, supra note 135 (“Equipopulous districts, drawn by incumbents for perpetual
political longevity, may offer no more prospect of translating electoral shifts into representational changes than did the old ‘rotten boroughs’ that were the proper target
of the [redistricting] reformers.”).
192. See supra Part IV.B.
193. Christopher C. Confer, To Be About The People’s Business: An Examination
of the Utility of Nonpolitical / Bipartisan Legislative Redistricting Commissions, 13
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 115, 118 (2003–2004) (“An alternative to legislative redistricting chosen by some states to combat the openly partisan maneuvering of members of the state legislature is the enactment by statute or through constitutional
amendment of legislative redistricting commissions.”).
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Id. at 119–23.
Litton, supra note 140, at 850.
Id. at 865.
Dixon & Hatheway, supra note 134.
Lee Papayanopoulos, Compromise Districting, in REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRICTING ISSUES 59, 61 (B. Grofman, A. Lijphart, R. McKay & H. Scarrow eds.,
1982).
199. Id. at 60.
200. Id. at 61 (“[S]uch a procedure need not strive to control gerrymandering
through artificial criteria but can be made to fight fire with fire. That is, [the model]
accepts gerrymanders as inputs and then allows them to cancel one another.”).
201. Id.
202. Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A Better Political Buffer?, 121
YALE L. J. 1808, 1839 (2011–12)
203. See Weaver, supra note 123.
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missions vary widely in composition, form, and function,194 but they share
the central goal of “increasing electoral responsiveness and decreasing
partisan bias.”195 Proponents of these commissions argue that “because
any successful plan requires the input and approval from both parties (or
at the least, from one party and a neutral chairman), the potential for
political mischief and aggressive partisan gerrymanders is greatly
reduced.”196
In light of arguments regarding “the virtual nonexistence of the
animal called the ‘nonpartisan,’”197 other scholars have proposed redistricting processes analogous to “labor-management contract negotiations
under binding arbitration.”198 Proponents of arbitrated redistricting argue
that redistricting plans are properly viewed as “allocations of limited (social/political/economic) resources among competing population
groups,”199 and thus advocate the use of zero-sum, give-and-take dynamics to achieve the same outcomes pursued by proponents of “nonpartisan” redistricting commissions.200 The arbitrated redistricting model rests
on the availability of “a judge or umpire whose career rides on his reputation for impartiality [as] the ultimate peacemaker between adversaries
whose optimal strategy is maximally selfish.”201 This realist model is incorporated to some degree in New Jersey, under the logic that “all redistricting is political, that any plan will likely be considered unfair by
somebody, and that the best outcome is a redistricting plan that fits
within the bounded set of ‘reasonably imperfect plans.’”202
Of course, the problem implicitly acknowledged by the arbitrated
redistricting model is that “no matter how [redistricting lines] are drawn,
some groups are advantaged and others are disadvantaged.”203 The most
effective (if most radical) solution to the problem of partisan gerrymandering, then, is to eliminate legislative districts altogether, and conduct at-
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large elections for all seats in a given legislature. Gerrymandering is the
drawing of district lines in a manner that depletes opposition voting
strength;204 a majority that cannot draw district lines cannot gerrymander,
and a majority cannot draw district lines where there are no districts to be
drawn. Of course, the elimination of electoral districts automatically entails the institution of proportional representation; but even opponents of
proportional representation recognize that it is the most effective means
of combating partisan gerrymandering.205 While there is no right to proportional representation under the U.S. Constitution,206 there is nothing
under that Constitution which precludes states from implementing proportional representation in their own legislatures if they so desire.207 Anyone concerned by the problem of partisan gerrymandering should at the
very least begin to consider the possibility of eliminating single-member
districts as a radical but effective solution.
VI. CONCLUSION
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204. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
205. See Peter Schuck, Partisan Gerrymandering: A Political Problem Without Judicial Solution, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS 240, 250 (Bernard
Grofman ed., 1990) (“Court-ordered reform of representational systems based on
Bandemer’s formulation of the problem will either be ineffective or it will be too
effective . . . [the latter] would propel the Court (and us with it) down a path whose
destination is proportional representation. A change that is so alien to our political
institutions should not be taken at the behest of the Court.”).
206. See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986) (“[T]he mere lack of
proportional representation will not be sufficient to prove unconstitutional
discrimination.”).
207. See, e.g., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973) (“[J]udicial interest
should be at its lowest ebb when a State purports fairly to allocate political power to
the parties in accordance with their voting strength and, within quite tolerable limits,
succeeds in doing so.”).
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Partisan gerrymandering dilutes voting power and degrades citizenship. Unfortunately, based on the partisan motivations that drive legislative action, legislative redistricting has the tendency to devolve into
partisan gerrymandering. This tendency must be combated at every turn.
There is more than one way to combat the problem of partisan gerrymandering. Although Vieth v. Jubelirer may have foreclosed the path of
private litigation, partisan gerrymandering may still be resisted at a structural level. In certain instances, our basic system of checks and balances
may serve as an effective impediment to partisan gerrymandering. Unfortunately, the New Mexico Supreme Court’s opinion in Maestas v. Hall
damaged this system of checks and balances by undermining the execu-
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tive veto and failing to embrace a position of aggressive judicial oversight
of legislative redistricting. At the same time, the court should be lauded
for elevating traditional redistricting principles which may impede the
partisan gerrymandering efforts of future legislatures.
At its earliest opportunity, the New Mexico Supreme Court should
reconsider the legislative-deferential mindset which led it to undermine
basic checks on partisan gerrymandering in Maestas v. Hall. Simultaneously, the people of this state should begin to consider the viability and
desirability of more thorough reforms, including non-partisan redistricting commissions, arbitrated redistricting, and implementation of proportional representation.
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